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Bretton Woods and After (1) 
by lan Davidson 
The  international  monetary  negotiations  concluded  at  Bretton  Woods,  in  New 
Hampshire, in July 1944,  represented the first  ever attempt to set universal rules for  the 
management of payments,  credit  and exchange  rates.  These  rules  were  a  major  step 
forward  from  the  chaos of the pre-war years,  and  made possible  a  period of unpre-
cedented  economic  prosperity  and  stability.  Their  shortcomings-the  failure  to  deal 
adequately  with  chronic surpluses and deficits-lay behind the  international monetary 
crises of the late 1960's. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  legacy  of  the  Second 
World War was the establishment of a  series  of inter-
national institutions based on the principle of economic 
liberalism  and  law.  Liberalism,  because  the  United 
States and Britain (who were preparing actively for the 
post-war  period  even  while  hostilities  were  going  on) 
were  historically  attached  to  the  ideas  of freedom  of 
trade and payments; law, because the absence of com-
monly-agreed rules and institutions had exacerbated the 
international  repercussions  of  the  pre-war  slump,  in 
which  every country had taken desperate, independent 
and  mutually  destructive  measures  to  protect  its  own 
economy. The British and American governments were 
determined  to  avert  the  repetition  of an international 
economic chaos  which  had contributed,  in  large  part, 
to  the  rise  of  Nazism  in  Germany.  John  Maynard 
Keynes,  who  led  the  British  negotiating  team,  had 
shown that it was possible  to reverse  economic down-
turns by government spending, and the  British govern-
ment  was  anxious  that  the  post-war  international 
monetary system should  be  designed  to help  maintain 
full employment; in other words, governments must no 
longer  be  forced  to deflate  whenever  their  balance  of 
payments ran into deficit with the rest of the world. 
The International Monetary Fund, whose charter was 
negotiated at Bretton Woods and which was to  be the 
keystone of the post-war international monetary system, 
made two quite  different kinds  of provision  for main-
taining full employment and freedom of trade and pay-
ments. In the first place, it established a new set of rules 
for exchange rates, and in the  second it  set up a  new 
system of international credit. 
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Before the  First World War,  the  world operated on 
what  may  loosely  be  described  as  the  gold  standard: 
most major currencies were backed by gold or consisted, 
at least  in  part,  of  gold  coins;  and  gold  was  inter-
nationally  acceptable  as  a  medium  of  exchange; 
exchange  rates  therefore  tended  to  be  fixed  in  terms 
of  gold.  The  gold  standard  broke  down,  however, 
between the two world wars, largely because the avail-
able  supply  of  gold  failed  to  grow  as  fast  as  inter-
national  trade  and  payments,  and  the  volume  of 
international  transactions  had  to  be  supported  on  an 
increasingly narrow and precarious gold base. 
In modern parlance, the world was going through a 
liquidity  crisis.  In order  to  protect  themselves  against 
the  shortcomings  of  the  gold  standard,  countries 
resorted to a whole series of measures-such as  import 
quotas,  exchange  controls  and  domestic  deflation-
which appeared to preserve international monetary sta-
bility, but only at the cost of restrictions on trade and 
economic growth. But by the Second World War it was 
clear that the orthodox gold  standard was  dead,  how-
ever  much  traditional  central  bankers  may  have 
regretted  the  fact,  and some  new  system  of exchange 
rates had to be found. 
At the centre of any stable system of exchange rates 
there  must  be  some  universally  accepted  standard  of 
value and universally acceptable store of value. General 
de Gaulle continued to believe, even in the late  1960's, 
that this role could only be fulfilled by gold "which does 
not change  in  nature,  which  can be  made  into  either 
bars, ingots or coins, which has no nationality, which is 
considered in all places and at all times the immutable and  fiduciary  value  par  excellence".  No  responsible 
authority shared his view or would have wished to turn 
the  clock  back fifty  years,  if only  because  they  could 
see  no reason to put the international payments system 
in thrall to the  arbitrary distribution  of gold  deposits 
in South Africa and the Soviet Union; in  the post-war 
period,  governments  started  believing  that  they  could 
control their economies more effectively. 
In 1944,  the obvious alternative to gold as the centre 
of the  international  monetary system,  was  the  Amer-
ican  dollar.  The  economy  of  virtually  every  other 
industrialised  country had  been  shattered  by  the  war, 
and  the  imports  that  they  all  needed  for  reconstruc-
tion could only come from the United States. The dollar 
was  therefore the only currency which was universally 
acceptable, since it alone could be used to purchase the 
goods  that  everybody  wanted,  and  it  seemed  natural 
to  make  it  the  standard  of  value  in  the  new  inter-
national monetary system. 
The currency of virtually every other non-Communist 
country  was  therefore  expressed  in  dollars,  and  the 
exchange  rate registered  with  the International  Mone-
tary Fund (or,  as  it is  sometimes called,  its  par  value) 
was  maintained  by  the  relevant  central  bank  buying 
or selling  dollars  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  A 
certain amount of latitude was allowed, with a  margin 
of  up  to  1  per  cent  above  and  below  the  central 
exchange rate.  But if the  pound, for example, were  to 
fall  1  per  cent  below  its  par  value  in  the  foreign 
exchange  market,  the  Bank  of  England  would  be 
obliged  to  buy pounds;  whereas  if  it  rose  1  per cent 
above  the  parity,  the  Bank  would  be  obliged  to  sell 
pounds;  in  each  case  to  keep  the  pound  at,  or  very 
close to, its official exchange rate. In practice, the major 
European  central  banks  tended  to  support  their  cur-
rencies even closer to their par values than this, within 
a margin of 3/4 of 1 per cent. 
The United States  was the only  country which was 
not obliged by the rules of the International Monetary 
Fund to support its  currency  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets in this way, since every other country was sup-
porting  its  currency  against  the  dollar.  (The  US  was 
not  forbidden  to  intervene  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets,  however,  and  20  years  after  the  war,  when 
the dollar began to be regarded as a weak currency, the 
American  authorities  did  help  to  support  it  in  the 
foreign  exchange  markets,  in  collaboration  with  other 
central banks.) 
Gold was not entirely banished from the new  inter-
national  monetary  system,  even  though  its  role  was 
much reduced. The obligation of the American author-
ities  was  not  to  buy  and  sell  foreign  currencies,  but 
to buy and sell gold at a price of $35  an ounce, a price 
fixed  by  Congress  before  the  war.  Thus,  though  the 
dollar was  at the centre  of the  system,  it was  backed 
by, and convertible into, gold. 
The aim of this new  international monetary system, 
known as  the gold  exchange standard, was  to  provide 
a  stable  framework  of relatively  fixed  exchange  rates, 
which  would  facilitate  the  expansion  of  international 
trade  by  giving  businessmen  a  reasonable  degree  of 
certainty about the prices at which they would be buy-
ing and selling.  There was,  of course,  no way  of pre-
venting  the  prices  in  one  country  from  getting  com-
pletely  out of line  with  the  general  level  of prices  in 
the rest of the world, since  each government was free 
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to run  its  economy  as  it thought  best,  with  whatever 
rate  of  domestic  inflation  was  politically  acceptable. 
But  if  a  country  did  get  out of line  in  this  way,  it 
would  cease  to  be  internationally competitive,  and its 
exports would no longer be large enough to pay for its 
imports. In other words, it would start running chronic 
balance-of-payments deficits, and if it was judged to be, 
in the International  Monetary Fund jargon,  in a  state 
of "Fundamental disequilibrium", it would be entitled, 
and might even be forced,  to change its exchange rate 
against  the  dollar.  So,  Britain  devalued  the  pound 
from  £1 = $4  to £1  = $2.80  in  1949,  and again down 
to $2.40  in  1967;  but revalued  to approximately  $2.60 
in 1971. 
In practice,  however,  the  system  has  been  weighted 
in favour of fixed  exchange rates, and this institutional 
bias  has  been  reinforced  by  uniformed  political  pre-
judices.  Governments,  and  their  electorates,  have  too 
often regarded the value of their currency as  an inter-
national  virility  symbol,  and  because  they  have  con-
sidered  devaluation  (or  in some  cases,  revaluation)  as 
a  national  humiliation,  they  have  generally  delayed 
making the  appropriate change  in  their exchange  rate 
for far too long. Since the monetary crises of 1967-1971, 
even  politicians  have  acquired  a  more  sophisticated 
outlook,  and learned  that  an  exchange  rate  is  simply 
a  price  like  any  other,  which  need  not  bear  any 
chauvinistic or emotional overtones. 
This exchange-rate system  was  supplemented,  in the 
charter of the International Monetary Fund, by a  new 
scheme  of  international  credit,  in  which  the  Fund 
played a  role similar to that of a bank, taking deposits 
and  making  loans.  A  credit  system  was  required  in 
order to buttress  the principle  of fixed  exchange  rates 
since  it is  always possible that a  country will  get into 
severe  but  temporary  balance-of-payments  difficulties 
which do not imply that it is  in a  state of fundamental 
disequilibrium. If it did not have access  to  emergency 
finance,  it could exhaust its  reserves  and be  forced  to 
devalue,  simply  because it was  no longer able  to sup-
port  its  currency  against  the  dollar  in  the  foreign 
exchange markets. 
John  Maynard  Keynes,  and  his  American  opposite 
number,  Harry Dexter  White,  started  out with  rather 
different ideas about the appropriate role of the Fund, 
but both of them envisaged very radical and ambitious 
schemes  which  would  have  given  the  Fund  not  only 
great  independence  in  the  raising  and  distributing 
finance  but  also  great  authority  in  supervising  the 
economic policies of the member governments. 
Their  ideas  were  too  ambitious  for  the  American 
Congress,  and  had to  be  watered  down.  Yet even  so, 
the  IMF  represented  a  major  step  forward  in  the 
rational  management  of  international  liquidity.  The 
Fund's financial resources are made up of contributions 
from each member state, known as its quota, with each 
country's  quota  being  determined  initially  by  a  com-
plicated  formula  made  up  of the  size  of its  national 
income,  its  volume of trade and its  gold  and foreign-
exchange holdings. 
One  ingenious  feature  of the  scheme  was  the  way 
the national contributions to the Fund's resources were 
made up.  A  quarter of the quota had normally to be 
paid in gold, but the remaining three quarters was in the 
form of national currency. This was ingenious because, 
whereas pounds, for example, are useless to the British for the purpose of settling their import bills until  they 
are converted into foreign  currency, they  may well  be 
useful  to  other  countries  that  wish  to  import  goods 
from Britain. Thus the quota system multiplies the sup-
ply  of useable  finance  available to the  Fund by four. 
The other ingenious  feature  of the scheme  was  the 
way  in  which  these  resources  were  to  be  lent by  the 
Fund. Normally a  member country can drawn foreign 
exchange  from  the  IMF  automatically  up  to  an 
amount equivalent to its  gold  subscription (or, as  it is 
technically  known,  its  "gold tranche").  But it does  so 
by "purchasing" the foreign currency with an equivalent 
amount  of its  own  currency;  thus  the  total  value  of 
the Fund's resources  is  not depleted  by  the  operation, 
even  if  some  of  the  currencies  it  holds  are  less  in 
demand  than others;  for  obviously  the  currency  of a 
country which  is  in  deficit and needs  to borrow from 
the Fund will  be  less  in demand with  other countries 
than the currencies of surplus countries. 
But  a  country  can  go  on  purchasing  foreign  cur-
rency from the  Fund beyond its  gold  tranche,  though 
the  more  it  borrows,  the  more its  borrowings  and its 
domestic economic policies are examined by the Fund: 
it obviously makes no sense  for it to go on borrowing 
from  the IMF if it is  really  in  a  state of fundamental 
disequilibrium,  since  in  that  case  it  has  little  or  no 
prospect of being able to repay, and if domestic defla-
tion does  not reverse  the balance of payments  deficit, 
it would  do far better to change  its  exchange rate by 
devaluing. (Devaluation means reducing the value of the 
currency against the dollar and therefore against other 
currencies;  revaluation  means  raising  the  value  of the 
currency against the dollar and other currencies.) 
The absolute credit limit is  reached when the Fund's 
holding  of a  borrower's  currency  amounts to  200  per 
cent of its quota: since the Fund starts out with 75  per 
cent of the quota in that currency, this means that the 
borrower can put in another 125  per cent of its quota 
in its own currency, i.e.,  draw foreign currency equiv-
alent to 125 per cent of its quota. 
Since  the  Fund was  only  intended  to  provide  tem-
porary  finance  for  countries  which  ran  into  passing 
balance of payments difficulties,  withdrawals had to be 
repaid  fairly  rapidly.  First  repayments  fall  due  after 
three years, the repayment has to be completed within 
five  years, and repayment naturally means buying back 
one's own currency by depositing foreing currency (or 
gold). 
Naturally,  there  are  a  great  many  minor  rules  and 
regulations  which  have  not  been  discussed  here,  and 
the  implementation  of  the  Fund  rules  has  changed 
slightly  over the years.  But there is  one subtlety about 
the  Fund's operations  which  is  worth pointing  out at 
this  stage,  because  it  has  led  to  serious  problems  in 
recent years. The Fund starts life with a fixed  quantity 
of  currency  from  each  member  states,  equivalent  to 
75 per cent of the member state's quota. But if Britain, 
for example,  draws  dollars  from  the  Fund to  meet  a 
balance-of-payments deficit, the Fund's dollar holdings 
are thereby reduced;  the United  States is  thereby con-
sidered to be in a  creditor position with the Fund and 
its  automatic  drawing  rights  are  increased  by  the 
amount of Britain'r dollar drawing. On the analogy of 
its original automatic drawing rights, based on its gold 
tranche, this creditor position is known as its super-gold 
tranche. 
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In practice, of course, the US is  unlikely  to want to 
draw on the Fund if other countries are in deficit since 
it is, presumably, in surplus. The problem can arise, and 
has  arisen,  when  other  countries  wish  to  repay  their 
drawings.  Because  of its  payments  deficits  the  US  in 
1971-with its  gold  holdings,  well  below  the  level  of 
other countries' holdings  of dollars-decided  it would 
no  longer  buy  dollars  for  gold.  In  this  situation,  a 
country  holding  most  of  its  reserves  in  dollars  is  in 
difficulty; if it tries to pay its debt in dollars, it may well 
provide the Fund with more dollars than it can use, that 
is, push the dollar holdings above 200 per cent of quota. 
The  problem  arose  at the  beginning  of  1972  because 
the repayment of a series of British drawings coincided 
with massive payments deficits on the part of the US. 1 
In  the  broadest  terms,  this  is  the  problem  of con-
vertibility, that is,  the probem of converting the inter-
national  glut  of dollars  into  other  foreign  currencies 
which are welcome to other countries or acceptable to 
the  Fund. It has  not so  far  been  solved,  because  the 
dollar,  though  still  a  weak  currency  (i.e.,  in  excessive 
supply), is still the world's major reserve currency. 
But discussions  have  now  started  for  replacing  the 
dollar  by  some  other  international  reserve  medium, 
whose  supply  would  not  depend  on  the  American 
balance of payments. 
Several other points about the IMF are worth noting. 
First,  it  was  originally  intended  to  be  a  world-wide 
organisation, and the initial negotiations did include the 
Soviet Union, while a few East European countries even 
joined the organisation for a  short while.  But in  prac-
tice,  its  membership  has  been  confined  to  the  non-
Communist  countries,  almost  all  of  whom  are  now 
members.  Switzerland  is  the  only  important  indus-
trialised country which is not a member, though it does 
cooperate  with  the  Fund  and  has  lent  it  financial 
resources. 
Secondly, it is  important to remember that the Fund 
has a twin institution, the World Bank (its formal title 
is  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development),  whose  task  is  to  provide  long-term 
finance  for the developing countries. Both of them are 
agencies  of the  United  Nations,  and  both have  their 
headquarters in Washington. 
Thirdly, the IMF is  complemented in the trade field 
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which 
was originally intended to be a temporary stepping stone 
to an International Trade Organisation, but which  has 
remained as the principal body governing international 
trade practices, with  a  small  secretariat and a  director 
general.  GATT incorporated the same  ideals  of liber-
alism and law as the IMF, with the same attachment to 
freedom  of  trade  and  equality  of  treatment  between 
member  states.  The essential  rules  of GATT are  that 
all  countries  should  aim  to  abandon  all  forms  of 
quantitative  restrictions  on  trade,  and  should  apply 
uniform duties  on  imports,  whatever  their country  of 
origin.  The  only  exceptions  to  this  principle  of most 
favoured nation (MFN) treatment were British imperial 
1  The  US  payments  deficit  is  primarily  due  to  large  outflows  of 
capital, in the form of overseas investments and aid and US government 
expenditure overseas  such as funding their contributions to NATO. etc  .. 
and  the  war  in  Vietnam.  As  to  their  current  account  which  relates  to 
the  balance  of  trade,  this  has  until  very  recently  not  been  a  serious 
problem;  in fact  usually  in  surplus. preference,  based  on  historic  commercial  links,  and 
customs unions (like the Common Market) or free trade 
areas (like the European Free Trade Association). 
In  practice,  the  separation  between  trade  problems 
(which are dealt with  by GATT) and monetary prob-
lems  (which  come  under  the  International  Monetary 
Fund)  has  come  to  seem  increasingly  artificial.  Ways 
are  now  being  discussed  for  bringing  them  closer 
together. 
By  and large,  the IMP system  has served  the  world 
remarkably  well,  on  three  main  counts:  it  has  con-
tributed  substantially  to  the  liberalisation  of  interna-
tional trade and payments, and in so doing has played 
a  significant  part  in  the  most  remarkable  and  most 
sustained  period  of  economic  growth  that  the  world 
has probably ever known;  it has established an unpre-
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cedented  system  of international  credit,  based  on col-
lective decision-making; and it has contributed to stable 
exchange rates. 
But it has to be adapted over  the years  in  order to 
keep  pace  with  other  developments  in  international 
payments, and adaptations are still going on. 
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Pollution 
•  1n  Europe 
1966:  Accidental oil-spillage  in  R. Medway.  8000  birds  died. 
1967:  Torrey  Canyon  wrecked.  Severe  oil  pollution  on  coasts  of  Cornwall  and  Brittany. 
30,000  seabirds died. 
1969:  Rhine waters polluted by pesticide discharge  at Mainz.  4,000,000  fish  died. 
1969:  17,000  seabirds  found dead  in  Irish  Sea.  Total  death  roll  estimated at  100,000.  Cause 
uncertain.  May  have  been  an  industrial  chemical. 
1971:  In  December  dangerous  levels  of  cadmium  and  lead  recorded  in  river  and  air  at 
Avonmouth. Smelter closed  for  two  months and official  inquiry  ordered. 
1972:  In  January  80  drums  of dangerous  chemicals  washed  ashore  in  SW  England  after 
shipwreck. 
1972:  In February cyanide drums discovered  on  refuse  tips  in  Midlands.  Emergency  legisla-
tion  passed  imposing heavy  penalties  for  the  dangerous  dumping  of toxic  wastes. 
The European situation 
Europe  is  an  old  continent,  long  settled  and  long 
exploited. Its raw material resources have been  depleted or 
reduced to  negligible  quantities.  The spread  of agriculture 
has caused the disappearance of formerly continuous broad-
leaved forests, the drainage of wetlands and the reclamation 
of the heathlands of Northern Europe. As  a result of rapid 
population  growth  and  industrial  development,  Europe 
has  become increasingly  dependent on overseas  supplies  of 
raw  materials  and  energy.  Its  own  use  of  the  soil,  in 
response to the enormous demand for agricultural products, 
has  been  greatly  intensified. 
An increasing  majority  of Europeans  are  town-dwellers. 
Manufacturing industries  and markets  are  concentrated  in 
restricted  areas,  exerting  unrelenting  pressures  upon  the 
environment  by  the  combined  demands  and  wastes  of 
factory  and consumer.  In these  centres  huge  quantities  of 
water are needed for domestic and industrial purposes and 
for  the  removal  of  sewage  and  effluents.  The  air  above 
and within  the cities  is  used  as  a  dumping  space  for  the 
waste  products  of  chimneys  and  exhaust  systems.  The 
movement of goods  and  people,  without  which  our  cities 
would  atrophy,  necessitates  the  use  of  cars  and  lorries, 
themselves  major  causes  of noise  and  atmospheric  pollu-
tion. The visual landscape, perhaps comprising only sprawl-
ing  suburbs,  often has  little  aesthetic  appeal. 
In  mral  areas  modem  farming  practices  are  further 
endangering  the  precarious  balance  in  man's  use  of  the 
land. The construction of motorways and of tourist ameni-
ties  is  reinforcing the human impact upon the countryside. 
The  economies  of  Europe  are  committed  to  future 
growth.  The citizen  accepts  this  as  a  guarantee that living 
standards will continue to improve. But increases in present 
styles  of production  and consumption  will  inevitably  lead 
to  greater waste. 
Pollution  is  a  result  of the improper  disposal  of waste. 
It may  be  seen  as  a  local  problem affecting  an immediate 
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environment.  Such a perception is  often too restricted since 
the  aggregate  of  evidence  drawn  from  other  localities 
would  reveal  a  more  extensive  danger.  The  complexities 
of  inter-relationships  within  ecosystems  confound  most 
attempts  to  indentify  simple  cause-and-effect  mechanisms 
and  make  the  isolation  of  an  individual  factor  and  its 
influence  extremely  difficult. 
Air pollution 
The inhabitant of Salford has six times as  great a chance 
of dying  from  bronchitis as  someone  living  in  Eastbourne. 
A  study  in  West  Germany  reveals  that  the  sickness  rate 
in large towns is  57  % higher than the average rate for the 
population  as  a  whole  and  the  expectation  of life  for  a 
child  in  a  city  is  two  or  three  years  less  than  for  one 
born in  a  village.  Such  harm to the health of city-dwellers 
is  attributed  mainly  to  the  presence  of  dust  and  toxic 
compounds  in  the  air,  but  other  agents,  such  as  noise, 
are  also  important. 
The need for reductions in levels of atmospheric pollution 
in  towns  has  long  been  recognised,  at  least  on  a  local 
scale;  the  Dutch  town  of  Haarlem  had  a  by-law  in  1608 
prohibiting  the  use  of  coal  in  breweries.  The  British 
Clean Air Acts of 1956  and  1968  have rid many industria] 
centres of the heavy yellow pall of smoke. London's winter 
sunshine  has  doubled.  But  in  the  absence  of  effective 
measures  the  waste  products  of burned  fuel  and  refinery 
processes  remain  a  serious  menace  in  many  of  Europe's 
large  towns.  The  existence  of  an  Alkali  Inspectorate  to 
enforce standards in  British factories  did not preclude  the 
crisis  at Avonmouth in December  1971  when  the detection 
of dangerous  quantities of lead in  the air in and near the 
smelter forced  it to  close.  For some  years  the  fall-out  of 
sulphur  dioxide  emitted  from  power  stations  in  Northern 
England has been monitored in Sweden, where it adversely 
affects  tree growth. The  situation  in  urban  areas  is  acutely  aggravated  by 
the  increasing  number  of cars.  The  following  figures  for 
private  cars  are  taken  from  the  UN  Statistical  Year  book 
1968: 
Millions  Millions 
in  1960  in  1967 
France  5.5  11.5 
West  Germany  4.3  10.7 
Italy  1.9  7.3 
United  Kingdom  5.6  10.6 
The affront to the senses of the noise and smell of traffic 
is  blatant  but  the  full  effects  of  the  toxic  substances  in 
exhaust  gases  are  still  uncertain.  Investigation  has  shown 
that  lead  concentrations  in  the  air  in  Zurich  during  the 
period 1963  to  1970  increased by 41  per cent.  In the sum-
mer of 1971  photo-chemical smog,  usually  associated  with 
Californian cities, was  recorded in the countryside of S.  E. 
England. 
Three of the difficulties  which inhibit government action 
to protect the environment can be illustrated in the problem 
of air pollution.  Any  measures  which  significantly  reduce 
pollution directly affect production costs and will  be borne 
by  the  consumer.  The  Fiat  company  has  announced  that 
anti-pollution  devices  would  increase  the  ~roducti<;m. ~osts 
by 6  per cent.  Many factories  would reqmre  prohtbttively 
expensive  equipment  to  eliminate  all  pollutants  from 
chimneys. The increased costs would put many manufactur-
ers in an uncompetitive position in  comparison with foreign 
rivals,  a  fact  which  is  recognized  by  those  responsible  for 
enforcing  British  regulations. 
The absence of agreements  on  acceptable  standards  is  a 
further  problem.  International  variations  on  per~itted 
levels  of exhaust emission from  cars already cause dtfficul-
ties  in  engine  design.  The reluctance  of Britain  and other 
countries  to  adopt  stringent  measures  is  essentially  for 
commercial reasons. 
Man's  ignorance  of  the  effects  on  climate  and  health 
of  the  gradual  accumulation  of  pollutants  such  as  dust 
and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is  another argument 
used to  discourage widespread control.  Until experts agree, 
such  control  is  impossible,  certainly  on  a  global  scale. 
But the measurable costs  of polJution of the atmosphere 
are very great; in Britain they are est~mated at £350  m!llion 
per  annum.  Much  stronger  precautwns  are  economically 
justifiable  though  the  debate  continues  as  to  the  urgency 
of the environmental crisis. 
Fresh water supplies 
Rivers  are  a  cheap  conveyor  belt  for  the  removal  of 
unwanted  materials.  Untreated  sewage,  metallic  residues 
and chemicals are poured in at rates which the rivers cannot 
accommodate,  so  that the natural cleaning  processes  cease 
to  function.  Untreated  sewage  from  towns  and  farms 
causes  deoxigenation  of  the  water  and  brings  a  health 
hazard.  Above  Paris  the  Seine  contains  about  15  germs 
per  c.c.;  downstream  the  figure  is  1,500,000.  Post-war 
industrial  development  and the  expansion  of ports  accen-
tuates  the  severe  pollution  of  the  tidal  reaches  ot  many 
large  rivers. 
Through  biochemical  changes  the  Lake  of  Zurich  has 
been  rendered  "lifeless".  Lakes  Geneva,  Constance  and 
Maggiore  are  being  poisoned,  as  are  many  in  Eastern 
Europe.  In  1970  a  total  of  40,000  tons  of  phosphorous, 
salts and nitrogen were discharged into  Lake Constance in 
spite  of the  existence  of  an  international  commission  for 
its  protection. Population growth, industrial expansion and 
the intensification of farming make heavy demands on water 
supplies. The per capita consumption is  already  wastefully 
high;  American  experiments  in  metering  domestic  supplies 
brought  a  50  per  cent  reduction  in  use.  The  aggregate 
demand in Europe can  be  met  only  by expensive  storage 
systems whilst the purification of supplies which have  been 
needlessly contaminated increases operating costs. 
National  policies  for  improving  water  quality  vary 
greatly  in  effectiveness.  In  some  countries,  notably  Italy, 
the situation worsens.  In Britain, where appropriate legisla-
tion was first  passed in  1848,  the campaign initiated by the 
Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts,  1951-1961  has brought 
improvements.  In  December  1971  a  Government  report 
described 4.3  per cent of non-tidal rivers as grossly polluted, 
compared  with  6.4  per  cent  in  1938.  The  lower  Thames, 
formerly 'dead', now contains several species  of fish.  Plant 
capacity  for  sewage  treatment  has  been  grea~ly  enlar~ed. 
The effective  reduction  of the  effects  of chemtcal  appltca-
tions  in  agriculture given  the present commitment to  high 
crop yields,  will  be  more  difficult  to achieve. 
Over 80  per cent of Europe's lakes and rivers  are shared 
by two  or more states.  International  ~oop~ration. is  there-
fore  essential.  In  this  context  the  Rhme  IS  an  Important 
example  although  many  others,  such  as  the  DaJ?ube  a!ld 
the  Oder,  which  is  heavily  polluted  by  Czech  mdustnes 
yet remains an important source of water for Poland nearer 
the  sea,  demonstrate  the  same  issues. 
The Rhine  has  often  been  described  as  a  gigantic  open 
sewer.  Over 6,000 poisonous substances have been identified 
in its waters and at its mouth the germ content is  2,000,000 
per c.c.  French  potash  mines  and  German  coal  and  che-
mical  industries  dispose  of  huge  quantities  of  salts  and 
metallic  compounds,  whilst  shipping  puts  12,000  tons  of 
oil  into  the  river  each  year.  Yet  this  sewer  is  a  major 
source of water for drinking,  irrigation and manufacturing 
in  the Netherlands. Population growth and saline  contami-
nation  of  ground-water  supplies  force  the  Dutch  to  rely 
increasingly  upon  the  Rhine.  The  hazards  of  ~~69,  ~hen 
an  accidental  discharge  of five  barrels  of pesttctde  ktlled 
four million fish,  underlines the problem.  Dutch problems 
are illustrated  by the  sale  of bottled  drinking  water  from 
Norway in early 1972. 
Since  1950  the  Rhine has been the subject of an lterna-
tional  Commission  for  Protection,  legalised  by  treaty  in 
1965  and involving five  countries.  The inadequacy  of this 
organisation  is  confirmed  by  the  proposal  in  March  1972 
to  set  up  a  new  agency  with  strong  powers  of  decision. 
The seas around Europe 
"There is  only one pollution, because all toxic substances 
end in the ocean" (Commander Cousteau, speaking in 1970 
to  the  Consultative Assembly  of the  Council  of Europe). 
In the seas  accumulate  the  non-biodegradable  agricultural 
chemicals,  halogenated  hydrocarbons,  heavy  metals  such 
as  mercury,  cadmium,  zinc  and  lead  and  the  deliberately 
dumped  containers  of  obsolete  poisons  and  radioactive 
materials.  Accidental discharges  of oil and chemicals often 
have an immediately alarming impact upon marine habitats 
but  it  is  the  insidious  build-up  of  contamination  which 
causes  the  most  extensive  damage.  According  to  Com-
mander Cousteau, the intensity of sealife has diminished by 
30 per cent to 50  per cent in the last twenty years through-
out the world, whilst the situation is  more serious in  areas 
such  as  the  Mediterranean,  the  Baltic  and the  North Sea. 
Resorts  have  proliferated  along  the  littorals  of these  seas, 
ruining  the  landscape  and,  with  their  untreated  effluents, 
destroying  their  main  attraction.  The  Channels  and  the 
North Sea carry the most congested shipping routes in the 
world  and  are  consequently  exposed  to  further  risks. DEFINITION 
Air Pollution: Physical and chemical 
changes through introduction of dust, 
smoke, gasses, such as S02, CO, C02, 
metallic  and  radioactive  substances. 
Over-heating of urban areas. 
Noise  Pollution:  Any  disagreeable 
auditory sensation. The danger thresh-
old is  about 85  decibels. 
Fresh  Water  Pollution:  Changes  in 
composition through toxic  substances 
and  organic  materials.  Phosphates 
stimulate  bacteriological  activity, 
causing  deoxygenation;  bacteria  die 
and natural autopurification ceases. 
Marine  Pollution:  Contamination, 
causing  physical  and  chemical 
changes, through organic, radioactive, 
chemical  and  mine-wastes. 
Soil  Pollution:  Broadly  defined  it 
includes man-induced deterioration of 
fertility and accelerated erosion. Also 
poisoning  by  waste-dumping. 
EFFECTS 
Reduction  of  sunlight.  Increased 
acidity  of rain  and  soil.  Malforma-
tion  and prevention  of plant growth. 
Lung  diseases  and  contamination  of 
blood.  Corrosion  of  buildings  and 
poisoning  of water. 
Deterioration  and,  after  prolonged 
exposure,  permanent loss  of hearing. 
Nervous  disorders.  Accidents  and 
inefficiency.  54  per cent of Germans 
complain of noise nuisance. 
Death  of  plants,  fish,  birds,  etc. 
Fouling of drinking supplies. General 
health hazard through increased germ 
content. Expensive purification neces-
sary. 
Death  or  decline  of  marine  life. 
Health  hazards.  Oil-ling  of  coasts. 
Death of sea  birds. 
Disappearance of plant species, decline 
of  micro-organisms  in  soil.  Loss  of 
top soil.  Heavy fertilizer  applications 
with  diminishing  returns. 
CAUSES 
Emissions from factory and domestic 
chimneys  and  cars.  Nuclear  experi-
ments.  In  Germany,  60  per  cent 
caused  by  transport,  18  per cent  by 
industry,  13  per  cent  by  power 
stations,  6  per  cent  by  domestic 
heating,  3  per  cent  miscellaneous. 
Road  traffic.  Aircraft,  industrial 
machinery. 
Chemical  and  organic  effiuents  from 
industry,  households,  farms  (pestici-
des,  fertilizers,  detergents,  sewage, 
etc.).  Warm  effiuents  from  power 
stations. 
Cumulative  effects  of air,  river  and 
soil  pollution.  Deliberate  and  acci-
dental discharges by shipping. Dump-
ing of poisons. 
Atmospheric pollution fall-out.  Hou-
sehold  debris.  Non-biodegradable 
materials  (e.g.  plastics)  and  toxic 
substances  (e.g.  cyanide). In the North Sea, a  major source of protein for Europe, 
the  exploitation  of oil  and gas-fields  adds  to  fears  for its 
fishing  resources  already  aroused  by  evidence  of  heavy 
pollution. There are many local examples of fatal  contami-
nation.  In  N.  E.  England  research  has  revealed  abrupt 
contrasts  in  marine  life  between  clean  shores  and  those 
affected  by  coal  waste.  Numerous  mortalities  amongst 
terns in  the  Danish  Waddenzee  were  traced to  a  pesticide 
carried by the Rhine. 
The physical  constraints  of the  Baltic  and the  Mediter-
ranean, both virtually enclosed and fed  by polluted rivers, 
have  been  emphasised  in  recent  years  by  outbreaks  of 
illness  caused  through  bathing  and  eating  contaminated 
fish.  Drastic protective measures are urgently  needed. 
The general alarm over the deteriorating situation prompt-
ed  a  series  of  international  meetings,  culminating  in  the 
Oslo  agreement  between  twelve  West  European  countries 
in  February,  1972,  to  prevent  the  chemical  dumping  of 
waste  in  the  North Sea  and  adjacent  Atlantic  areas. 
The soil 
The  complex  associations  of  organic  and  inorganic 
constituents which form  the living  soil  have been  modified 
and  nurtured  over  the  farmlands  of Europe  by  centuries 
of husbandry.  Serious  mistakes  have  occurred,  as  seen  in 
the  bare  hill-slopes  of  Southern  Europe,  but  in  many 
regions  an apparently stable and high level  of fertility  has 
been  achieved. 
The  1939-1945  war  and  subsequent  farm-support  pro-
grammes have brought an intensification of farming.  Tech-
nological  improvements  include  the  use  of pesticides  and 
weedkillers.  The increased  application  of inorganic  fertili-
zers,  often as  a  substitute for animal manure, is  illustrated 
by  the  average  amounts  used  in  Belgium  per  hectare  of 
cultivated  land in  kg: 
Year  I 
Nitrogen  I 
Phosphates  I 
Potash 
1910  13.9  19.8  4.1 
1950  41.2  47.5  51.1 
1967  94.8  90.0  107.7 
Monocultural  practices  and  the  substitution  of  pesticides 
for natural agents  which  have  disappeared,  or are  unable 
to  operate  effectively  in  the  artificial  conditions,  have 
reinforced  the  dependence  on chemicals.  Livestock  rearing 
on  factory  principles  has  brought  problems  of  disease 
control  and  wastedisposal.  The  aim  is  quantity  of output 
through increased capital investment per worker; the result 
is  increasingly  unnatural  methods  of  food  production. 
The social costs  of changes  in farming  methods,  though 
not  readily  measured,  must  be  set  against  this  higher 
productivity.  The disappearance of wildflowers  and  hedge-
rows,  the  greater  mortalities  amongst  seed-eating  birds 
and  their  predators,  the  destruction  of  wild-life  habitats 
and the long term effects of chemicals upon water resources 
and  human  health  must all  be  considered.  The  soil  itself 
suffers.  In  the  clay  soils  of  the  English  Midlands  the 
structure is  breaking  down;  the  quality  of the  Hampshire 
Downlands is  being improverished; in East Anglia top-soils 
are  eroded. 
Farmers  recognise  these  threats  to  their  livelihood.  But 
they  are  subject  to  economic  pressures  which  necessitate 
the  use  of  techniques  inconsistent  with  principles  of 
conservation. 
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Agents for the protection of the European 
environment 
Three main  categories can  be  distinguished: 
1.  There  are  numerous  voluntary  bodies,  of  varying 
stature, representative breadth and effective influence. These 
would  include,  briefly  to  indicate  their  range,  the  Noise 
Abatement  Society,  bird  protection  societies,  the  Friends 
of  the  Earth,  the  Conservation  Society  and  the  Club  of 
Rome. Some, like the latter, have an international composi-
tion  and  the  support  of  eminent  scientits  and  leading 
industrialists.  These  bodies  may  be  concerned  with  a 
specific  issue  or may take  a  comprehensive brief, as  repre-
sented  by  Blueprint  for  Survival.  (see  "Further reading") 
2.  National  governments  are  extending  the  range  of 
measures  against  pollution  to  remove  obtrusive  dangers 
and  to  combat  harmful  effects  of  modern  technologies. 
The extension of monitoring and research projects is  expos-
ing  the  inadequacies  of  existing  laws  and  standards,  but 
government  action  shows  great variation  according  to  the 
nature and degree of awareness of the  problems. In France 
and in  Britain "Ministries for the Environment" have been 
set  up  and  limited  programmes  defined.  Also  in  Britain 
there  is  a  permanent  Royal  Commission  working  on 
recommendation  for  pollution  control.  Rumania  has  a 
commission  for  combating  pollution  whilst  in  Hungary 
there is  a  committee  for  the  protection  of air purity.  But 
in  only  one  European  country,  West  Germany,  has  a 
comprehensive and long term programme been introduced; 
the necessary laws are now being passed. 
Public attitudes towards conservation policies are confus-
ed  or  apathetic  and  the  machinery  by  which  they  could 
be implemented  is  not yet  available.  Unilateral  action  to 
control  particular  forms  of  pollution  are  numerous,  but 
essentially  the  need  is  for  cooperation  between  nations. 
3.  There  are  many  international organisations  intent  on 
securing  safeguards  for  the  environment.  It  has  been 
observed that "there is  already a  plethora of organisations 
occupying  themselves  with  this  question"  (M.  Cravatte, 
European  Conservation  Conference,  1970).  In  addition  to 
the  many  non-governmental  bodies  these  include  the  UN, 
OECD,  the  Council  of  Europe  and  NATO.  Each  has 
initiated  and is  sponsoring  major research  programmes. 
The  information  available  from  research  projects  is  a 
necessary  prelude  to  legislation,  but  in  the  past  these 
projects  have  rarely  been  coordinated  nor  has  financial 
and political  support  been  commensurate  with  the  gravity 
of  the  dangers.  Where  the  problems  are  known  and 
international  organisations  make  recommendations  these 
are not unanimously adopted by member government. This 
is  shown  by  the  history  of  the  Rhine  Commission.  No 
measuring  apparatus  or  pollutant  threshold  has  been  ap-
proved  by  all  European  states. 
In  this  situation,  limited  regional  agreements  are  more 
readily achieved since  they involve  fewer signatures. Where 
there is  cooperation across a  range of economic and social 
activities  this  can  facilitate  harmonisation  of  pollution 
control.  The need  for  such  agreement  is  emphasised  in  a 
report  submitted  by  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Economic  Community  in  July  1971  (First  Communication 
of  the  Commission  on  the  Community's  Policy  on  the 
Environment:  Brussels  SEC [71]  2616).  The report stresses 
the  fact  that one  major obstacle  to  improved  measures  is 
the  costs  which  would  prejudice  the  competitive  position 
of national  industries. 
In  February  1972,  Dr.  Mansholt,  the  Community's 
commissioner responsible for agriculture, proposed a radical 
policy  for  environmental  protection  in  a  letter  to  the 
Commission's  President.  This  advocates  the  curbing  of 
growth and consumption and the abolition of social benefits 
for large families.  Rigorous  central planning would ensure 
for everyone a  minimum  on which to live  and a  five  year plan is  suggested  by  which  a  "closed circuit"  or recycling 
economy  would  be  developed.  Dr.  Mansholt  believes  that 
by  meeting  the  far-reaching  implications  of  his  proposals 
an enlarged Community could lead the world in the search 
for a  stable  society  in  a  stable environment. 
In March 1972,  the Commission put forward a  program-
me which is  based on the principle  that the polluter pays. 
It  urges  the  adoption  of  regulations  on  pesticides  and 
food  ingredients  by  1973  and  recommends  that  by  1974 
common  rules  on  water,  air  and  noise  pollution  should 
be  in  force. 
The choice 
As  the  information  on  environmental  deterioration  ac-
cumulates so anxieties increase. But an exaggerate:l concern 
for  the  environment  is  it~elf  in  danger  of  engendering 
disbelief.  To that  disbelief  is  added  the  confusion  caused 
by  controversy  between  experts. 
There  are  those  who  insist  that  we  must  stabilise  or 
reduce population sizes and forgo material advances. Others 
claim  that the  problem  is  essentially  a  technological  one 
which  can  be  solved  technologically.  Another  powerful 
body  of  opinion  asserts  that  "doom-mongering"  is  not 
justified  by  the  facts.  No  one  can  forecast  inevitable 
population growth to  a  disastrous  level;  even  the  evidence 
of the harmful effects of pesticides,  it is  claimed, is  largely 
circumstantial. 
Amongst  the  propronents  of these  different  arguments, 
the  degrees  of  objectivity  and  knowledge  vary  greatly. 
Certainly the chances of sound judgement are not enhanced 
by hysterical  alarm.  But  proof of the  arguments  of those 
who  dismiss  such  alarm  as  irrational  seems  to  require  a 
kind  of  "brinkmanship"  which  responsible  people  would 
be  wise  not to  countenance. 
The choice  before  European society would seem  not to 
be  whether  we  act to  avert  disaster,  but how  quickly. 
Further  reading 
There is  an enormous  amount of literature  on  environ-
mental  issues.  Most  of  the  following  authors  subscribe 
explicitly to one or the other of the arguments summarised 
in this text. 
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Nature  in  Focus  (Quarterly  Bulletin)  (both available from 
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The  major  issues  are  set  out  more  briefly  or  analysed 
in the following periodicals and newspaper articles: 
Blueprint  for  Survival,  Ecology,  (Jan.  1972). 
Nature:  Vol.  235;  Jan.  14  - The  Case  Against  Hysteria, 
(Jan.  28). 
Catastrophe  or  change?  (These  reply  to  Blueprint  for 
Survival). 
The  Guardian (Jan. 26  and 28,  1972) and 
The  Observer (March.  5,  12,  and 19,  1972) 
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Limits  to  Growth,  an  M.I.T.  report  commissioned  by 
the Club of Rome.  This report influenced  Dr.  Mansholt 
in  the  writing  of his  letter.) European  studies  1973 
New Towns 
•  1n  Western  Europe 
Articles in  previous issues of this publication have examined general aspects of urbanisa-
tion  in  contemporary  Europe  1.  In  this  article,  we  shall  look  more  closely  at  one  feature 
of the  urban  phenomenon:  the  new  town.  In  its  modern  (i.e.  20th  century)  development, 
the  idea  of creating  planned new  towns  has  originated  in  Britain  and spread  to  other parts 
of  Europe.  Although  other  countries  face  similar  urban  problems,  one  finds  marked 
differences  between  countries  in  the  solutions  which  are  being  introduced. 
Towns  and  cities  grow  or  decay  according  to  the 
changing  economic,  social  and  political  climate  of  the 
regional  environment in which  they are located.  Economic 
expansion  or  decline  affects  employment  opportunities 
which  may result in  in- or out-migration  for  urban areas. 
Population  growth,  traffic  congestion,  air  pollution  and 
other factors may require serious modification of prosperous 
urban centres.  Destruction of buildings in war time  bomb-
ing raids presented  opportunities in  some  European  towns 
and  cities  for  radical  new  designs.  Man  himself  changes 
in his environmental needs,  as  the expansion of car owner-
ship  has  strikingly  demonstrated.  The  new  town  concept 
has  been  developed  as  an  important  contribution  to  the 
contemporary European search  for  an  environment appro-
priate  for  man in a  densely  populated continent. 
The new town movement has its origins in late nineteenth 
century  Britain.  Seeking  a  solution  to  the  problem  of 
housing the poor in London.  Ebenezer Howard proposed 2 
the creation of carefully planned garden cities.  The garden 
city  was  envisaged  as  a  small  town  with  a  population  of 
no more  than  30,000  people.  Separated  from  other  urban 
areas  by  a  protective  green  belt  of agricultural  land,  the 
town  would  be  zoned  into  planned  industrial,  residential, 
commercial and cultural  districts,  or wards.  The responsi-
bility for planning  and developing  such  a  town  would  be 
vested  in  a  public  authority,  so  that  private  speculators 
could  not  interfere  with  the  master  plan  for  the  town. 
From these ideas emerged the plans for the towns of Letch-
worth  and  Welwyn  Garden  City.  An  adaptation  of  the 
garden  city  idea  was  the  concept  of  the  garden  suburb 
and  this  concept  was  to  materialise  in  several  European 
cities in the years  following  the first  World  War. 
The  influence  of  Howard's  ideas  can  be  traced  in  the 
writings  of  Lewis  Mumford,  Catherine  Bauer,  Clarence 
Stein,  Raymond Unwin  and Le Corbusier.  In the writings 
of Patrick  Geddes,  the  new  town  concept  was  extended; 
instead of new  towns  appearing  simply  as  solutions to the 
over-crowding of existing cities, he conceived of new towns 
as being essential components in plans for regional econom-
ic  growth.  Hence  some  new  towns  were  seen  as  growth 
points for industrial location and expansion,  integral parts 
of major  economic  regions. 
1  The  urban  phenomenon  in  Europe:  Part  I  in  Issue  No.  10  and 
Part ll in Issue No.  12. 
3  Tomorrow:  A  Peaceful  Path  to  Real  Reform,  by  E.  Howard, 
pub.  1898;  the  book  was  revised  in  1902  and  the  title  changed  to 
Garden Cities of Tomorrow. 
1 
These ideas, much discussed in planning and architectural 
circles,  reached  fruition  in  Britain in  the Greater  London 
Plan  prepared  by  Patrick  Abercrombie  and  published  in 
1944.  Already the  report of the  Barlow  Commission 3  had 
described  in  detail  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
British  large towns.  Abercrombie  proposed the creation of 
a  ring  of  satellite  towns  surrounding  London  to  accom-
modate  overspill  population  consequent  upon  a  massive 
rehousing  programme.  A  reserved  green  belt  in  which 
building  would  be rigourously  controlled should surround 
the city. 
The  passing  of the  New  Towns  Act  in  1946  provided 
Britain with  the administrative structure on which to  build 
a  programme  for  developing  new  towns.  This  structure 
gave  Britain  a  unique  advantage  in  Europe  and it should 
be  borne  in  mind  when  comparisons  are  made  between 
Britain's  progress  in  new  town development and the  expe-
riences  of other European nations. The 1946  Act  entrusted 
the  creation  of  new  towns  to  development  corporations 
appointed  and  financed  by  the  central  government.  Al-
though locally elected authorities would be responsible  for 
certain  features  of town  life,  as  in any other British  town 
of similar size  the development corporation was  given  the 
power  to  acquire  sites  and  to  provide  houses,  factories, 
commercial  buildings  and public services.  The corporation 
was  to  be  financed  by  government  loans. 
Between  1946  and  1950  twelve  new  towns  were  desig-
nated,  eight  in  the  London  ring  (Stevenage,  Crawley, 
Hemel  Hempstead,  Harlow,  Hatfield,  Welwyn,  Basildon 
and Bracknell),  two  in  Scotland  (East  Kilbride  and  Glen-
rothes) and four in other parts of Britain (Newton Aycliffe, 
Peterlee, Cwmbran and Corby).  Apart from the designation 
of Cumbernauld in 1956,  there was a lull in the programme 
until  1961  when  eleven  more  towns  were  designated.  A 
distinctive  feature  of the  second  wave  of new  towns  has 
been the attention paid to accommodating the motor vehicle. 
All the plans contain  a  town centre  comprising a  mixture 
of  commercial,  civic,  cultural  and  social  buildings,  resi-
dential  districts,  sometimes  designed  as  neighbourhood 
units with neighbourhood centres, and factory estates. 
Parallel to the new town programme and stemming from 
the  Town  Development  Act  of  1952,  a  programme  of 
expanded  towns  has  been  instituted.  "This  enables  large 
cities  and small  towns  to enter agreement whereby  accom-
modation  and  employment  would  be  provided  in  small 
3  Royal  Commission  on  the  Geographical  Distribution  of  the 
Industrial  Population,  Report  and  Evidence  (see  "Further  reading" 
at end of text). towns  for those people  who could not be rehoused in  the 
large  city  when  its  slums  or  near-slums  were  demolished 
and  redeveloped  at  lower  densities.  The  operation  was 
financed  jointly  by  government,  city  councils  and  county 
councils 4." Cities  such as  Manchester,  Liverpool,  London, 
Newcastle and Birmingham established overspill  links  with 
surrounding towns.  At the same time,  these  cities  engaged 
in massive programmes of suburban development and inner 
city  renewal. 
New  towns, expanded towns, suburban growth and inner 
city comprehensive redevelopment, these features of British 
post-war  planning  are  found  in  other  parts  of  western 
Europe.  Though  other  European  nations  may  lack  the 
political  and  administrative  structures  existing  in  Britain, 
when  faced  with  similar  urban  problems  they  have  come 
up with similar solutions. Whereas in Britain the expression 
"new  town"  has  a  very  precise  meaning,  the  expression 
must be used more loosely when applied to other countries. 
In  the  same  way  as  the  British  post-war  new  town 
programme  was  heralded  in  a  report  prepared  for  the 
capital  city,  so  in  France  did  a  new  town  programme 
emerge.  The  first  French  new  town  proposals  were  pub-
lished in 1965 in the Schema directeur for the Paris Region.5 
In  the  immediate  post-war  period,  France  faced  a 
serious  housing  problem.  The  inter-war  period  was  one 
of  stagnation  in  the  house  building  industry  and  the 
problem was  aggravated  by  the  losses  of buildings  due  to 
military destruction during the war. Reconstruction of towns 
rather  than  urban  expansion  was  the  important  priority 
in  the  late  1940's  and  1950's.  Industrial  prosperity,  rural 
depopulation  and  a  rising  birth  rate  were  factors  in  the 
increased demand for housing in post-war France. 
In 1958  housing priority areas were designated  (Referred 
to  as  ZUP:  Zone a urbaniser  en  priorite')  and  these  were 
predominantly suburban districts  in which  high  rise  apart-
ment  blocks  were  hurriedly  constructed.  These  grands 
ensembles,  completed mainly in  the  1960's,  were  dismissed 
by one observer in the phrase "Economist's solution,  urba-
nist's nightmare". In the Paris region some of these housing 
districts contained between thirty and fifty  thousand people. 
In population size  they are comparable to the first  genera-
tion  of British  new  towns  but here  the  comparison  must 
stop for  the French  urban zones  were  severely  functional 
in appearance and devoid of social and recreational facili-
ties.  As  a  reaction  to  these  initial  mass  housing  ventures, 
the  latest  grands  ensembles  have  been  conceived  quite 
differently.  The  change  can  be witnessed  in  the  southern 
suburb of Toulouse-Le  Mirail.  This  suburb,  nearing  com-
pletion, is  designed  to  accomodate  100,000  people  in  high 
density high-rise buildings. In Le  Mirail, attention has  been 
given  to  the non-housing  needs  of the  people  and incorp-
orated  into  the  plans  are  social,  recreational  and  educa-
tional  facilities. 
The housing priority zones  were  only a  partial solution 
to  France's  housing  problem.  Regional  planning  studies 
in  the  1950's  and  early  1960's  explored  the  relationship 
between  Paris and the provinces  (Paris  et le  Desert Fran-
~ais).  New  policies  were  framed  for  promoting  selected 
provincial  urban  centres  as  countermagnets  to  Paris.  In 
1964,  in  preparation  for  the  Fifth  Plan  (1965-1970),  eight 
such metro  poles d' equilibre  were  designated,  five  of which 
were  fusions  of neighbouring  large  towns  to  form  single 
planning  units.  In  1966  special  metropolitan  planning 
organisations  (OREAM,  Organisation  Regionale  d'Etudes 
d'Amenagement  d'Aire  Metropolitain)  were  established 
for  major  areas  where  future  expansion  would  be  con-
centrated-Lower  Seine,  Greater  Marseille,  the  Nord, 
Lyon/St.-Etienne,  Nancy/Metz,  NantesfSt.-Nazaire  and 
Bordeaux.  In  addition  to  the  Paris  region,  it is  in  these 
areas that attention has  been  given  to  the creation of new 
towns. 
4  Towns  in  the  Making  (see  "Further  reading"  at  end  of  text). 
5  See  E.S.T.S.  No.  12.  "The  Urban  Phenomenon  in  Europe  II." 
The  Parisian  Schema  directeur  is  tackling  the  major 
problem  of  accomodating  an  anticipated  growth  of  five 
million  more  people  by  the  end  of  the  century.  Already 
the Paris agglomeration contains almost 20  per cent of the 
population in France on little more than 2 per cent of the 
nation's  surface  area.  At  the  same  time,  the  plan  has 
outlined  the  inadequacies  of contemporary  Paris,  particu-
larly  the  underdeveloped  suburbs,  the  prohibitive  costs  of 
development in  the inner city  and the  over-dependence  of 
the  city  upon  the  single  central  core.  The  centralisation 
of  French  national  life  upon  Paris  is  legendary.  As 
M. Piquard reported: 
"Paris  is  the  city  in  which  one  seventh  of the  French 
population  is  concentrated.  Paris is  the political capital of 
the  country  and  has  one  fourth-500,00Q--of  all  French 
government civil  servants. It is  also  the  country's intellec-
tual  capital  with  33  per cent  of its  college  and  graduate 
students,  65  per cent of its  artists  and writers,  and 54  per 
cent of its  newspapers  and publishing houses.  In addition, 
Paris  is  the  business  capital  and accounts  for  half of the 
country's business turnover, and 64  per cent of the nation's 
companies-including  the  leading  ones-have  their  head 
offices  in  the  city.  Lastly  it is  the  industrial  capital,  with 
a  quarter of all industrial workers  (1,600,000),  58  per cent 
of the  electrical  construction  industry,  64  per cent  of the 
car industry and 80  per cent of the motion picture  indus-
try 6." 
Just as  the Greater London Plan proposed a  number of 
satellite towns outside London so  did the Schema directeur 
propose  the  creation  of a  number  of new  satellite  towns 
for  Paris.  Originally  eight  sites  were  suggested,  but these 
have since  been  reduced to five: 
New Town  Location 
1.  Melun-Senart  30  km SE  of  Paris 
2.  Saint-Quentin-en-
Yvelines  25  km  SW of Paris 
3.  Vallee  de  Ia  Marne  10  km  E  of Paris 
4.  Evry  30  km  S of Paris 
5.  Cergy-Pontoise  25  km  NW of Paris 
Planned 
Pop. 
in  1985 
300,000 
300,000 
300,000 
300,000 
250,000 
Work  on  these  new  towns  is  already  well  advanced.  It 
is  assumed  that  the  new  town  centres  will  be  completed 
within  the  period  of the  Sixth  Plan  (1971-1976).  Already 
some  200,000  people have moved in  to Evry.  The original 
target  figure  of  300,000  should  be  reached  by  1975  and 
it  is  now  envisaged  that  the  eventual  population  will  be 
between  400-500,000. 
In  addition  to  the  new  towns  around  Paris  within  the 
inner  suburban  ring,  renovation  has  begun  on  a  massive 
scale  in  six  urban  centres.  These  centres  are  La  Defense-
Nanterre, St.-Denis, Creteil, Versailles, Bobigny and Choisy-
le-Roi-Rungis.  These  restructured  urban  nodal  points  will 
serve  areas  housing  between  300,000  and  1,000,000 people. 
Their commercial,  industrial and social  facilities  are com-
parable  with  those  provided  in  major  French  provincial 
cities.  The  new  business  centre  of  La  Defense  comprises 
1,5  million  square  metres  of redevelopment,  mostly  office 
accommodation  for some  100,000  employees.  With  twenty 
tower  blocks  each  rising  to  over  200  m,  this  will  rank as 
the  largest such  development  in  Europe.  Four of the  new 
urban centres coincide with prefectures of new departments 
created in  1964:  Versailles  (Yvelines),  Nanterre (Hauts-de-
Seine),  Bobigny  (Seine-St.-Denis),  and  Creteil  (Val-de-
Marne). 
In  other  parts  of  France,  new  towns  are  proposed  in 
metropolitan development plans. Thus in the proposals for 
6  Regional Planning in France (see "Further reading" at end of text). the Basse-Seine, the creation of a new town at Le Vaudreuil, 
at  the  confluence  of  the  Eure  and  Seine,  is  seen  as  an 
overspill  town  for  Rouen.  Similarly  in  the  development 
plan  for  the  metropolitan  region  of  Lyon-St.-Etienne-
Grenoble,  the creation of a  new  town  at l'Isle  d'Abeau  is 
proposed. Sited 35  km south-east of Lyon and 70  km  from 
Grenoble, this town should have a population of 85,000  by 
1985.  In the Nord region a  new  town at Lille-Est,  between 
Lille  and  Roubaix is  planned with  a  population  target  of 
63,000  in 1985.  Finally in the Marseilles metropolitan plan 
new  urban  expansion  is  proposed  for  both  sides  of  the 
l'Etang de Berre. On the east side, a town with a population 
of 110,000  is  planned and on the west side,  an even larger 
growth,  associated  with  the  massive  _industrial  ex~ansion 
at  Fos,  is  planned.  Here  a  town  wtth  a  populatiOn  of 
215,000  is  being  developed. 
As  in Britain these new  towns  are seen  as  separate units 
from  the  urban  centres  with  which  they  are  associated. 
They  are not  designed  as  dormitory  suburbs.  Thus  these 
French  new  towns  will  contain  not  only  homes,  schools, 
shops, social and cultural facilities but also P.laces  of work, 
factories,  office  buildings,  research  laboratone~, and ware-
houses.  The  facilities  of  the  town  centres  Will  cater  for 
visitors  from  neighbouring  settlements  as  well  as  for  the 
new  town  residents.  As in British  new  towns  a  variety of 
building types is  planned for the residential districts,  inc.lu-
ding  individual  family  houses,  blocks  of  flats  of  V~I'):'mg 
levels,  and variable street patterns are propose~. A  ~tstmc­
tive feature  of French new  town  plans  is  the  mclusiOn  of 
a  lake  for  water  sports,  for  fishing  and  for  lake-side 
strolling. 
Following the British example, an administrative structure 
for the creation of French new  towns  has  been  produced. 
Proposals  for new  town  sites  are  included in  the  regional 
plans which are submitted, in the first instance, to a central 
committee  for  initial  discussions.  (This  committee  is  the 
GCPU:  Groupe  central  de  planification  urbaine.)  From 
here  the proposals are sent to  the  national planning  com-
mittee.  (CIAT:  Comite interministbiel pour l'amenagement 
du  territoire.) If this  committee approves the proposal,  the 
Prime Minister, on the advice of the Ministere  de  I' Equipe-
ment et du  Logement,  appoints the head of a  development 
team  which  will  be  responsible  for  the  detailed  planning 
of the town. This team is comparable to the British develop-
ment corporation.  In  May  1970  a  new  body  wa~ formed, 
le  groupe  central  des  villes  nouvelles,  to  coordmate  the 
administrative  and  financial  arrangements  for  the  new 
towns.  By  a  law of June 1970,  the  French Parliament has 
defined  the  relationship  between  the  communes  in  whose 
territory new  towns  are to  be  located and the  new  autho-
rities  in the new  towns. 
Some  interesting  comparisons  can  be  drawn  between 
the British and French experience of new town development. 
The nine French new  towns have  been  conceived  as  sepa-
rate entities  playing  an important role in the most highly 
developed  economic  regions.  Initial  interest  has  focussed 
on the capital cities in both countries. The need for a special 
administrative structure has been  recognised by  the French 
government. Where the first  French new to"':ns  differ  from 
their  British  counterparts  is  in  the  populatiOn  targets  set 
for the towns.  In Britain,  the  first  new  towns  were  set  to 
grow to populations between  30,000  and 50,000.  In France, 
the initial  target figures  were  between  100,000  and  300,00, 
recently  revised  target  figures  exceed  300,000.  In  Britain, 
such  developments  would  be  described  as  new  cities.  By 
the early 1960's it was  clear in  Britain that the small sized 
new  towns  could  only contribute in a  very  small  way  to 
Britain's urban problems. This lesson has been well learned 
by the French, who, faced with housing problems far more 
acute  than  Britain's,  have  realised  that  towns  of  a  large 
size must be planned if they are to  make  a lasting impact. 
In the Netherlands,  new  towns  are seen  as  solutions  to 
two  quite  different problems.  On the one hand, new  towns 
have  been  planned  as  focal  points  for  settlement  on  the 
reclaimed  land  of  the  polders,  on  the  other,  they  are 
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planned  as  parts  of  the  intensively  settled  region  in  the 
south and west of the Netherlands. 
On the polders, the planner is "given flat, two-dimensional 
country and variety is not provided by nature. One cannot 
simply  Jet  ones's  imagination  go  and  introduce  variations 
unless  they  fit  in  with  the  scheme  of things,  because  to 
do  so  would  be  inappropriate  in  an  economy  aiming  at 
rationalisation,  and  even  more  so  because  any  pointless 
variation would instantly strike one as artificial 7." 
On  the  Ysselmeer  polders,  it  was  found  necessary  to 
plan  hamlets  and  villages.  Whereas  a  hamlet  is  seen  as 
simply  a  concentration  of  dwellings,  a  village  contains 
shops,  cafes,  schools,  churches, a  village  hall or other club 
building and small  workshops.  The complexity of religious 
life  in  the  Netherlands  meant  that  a  new  village  would 
need  at  least  three  churches  and  possibly  three  schools. 
Associated with  the  churches  are  clubs,  many having their 
own buildings,  and the political parties.  One-family houses 
with front and back gardens were designed for agricultural 
labourers  and  these  were  placed  off  the  main  thorough-
fare  which  was  lined  by  the  main  village  buildings.  On 
the  new  polders,  the  problem  of  urban  development  is 
clearly  quite  unlike  the  problems  already  referred  to  in 
Britain  and  France.  But  the  problem  of  developing  new 
forms  of  settlement  in  rural  areas  is  mot  unique  to  the 
Dutch.  Similar  problems  are  experienced  in  the  Scandi-
navian  countries,  in  Scotland,  parts  of  France  and  in 
southern Italy. 
Determining  the  number  of  villages,  their  population 
size,  their  location  and  the  details  of  the  development 
plans,  proved  very  difficult  in  a  period  of  rapid  agricul-
tural  change.  Lessons  learned  in  the  first  settled  polder, 
the  Weiringermeer,  in  the  1930's  resulted  in  changes  in 
the  post-war  settlement  of  the  much  larger  North-East 
Polder.  In  the  latter  not  only  were  ten  small  villages 
planned,  with  populations  ranging from  400  to  3,000,  but 
also a larger settlement at Emmeloord. 
Construction  at  Emmeloord  began  during  the  second 
World  War  and  its  population  is  now  approximately 
10,000.  The site is  dominated by a  grid of canals  and the 
intersection  of main  roads.  At the centre of the town is  a 
square  bounded  by  office  buildings  and  a  large  block 
incorporating a  hotel,  theatre and a  farmers'exchange  hall. 
Residential districts are separated from each other by green 
zones.  Shops,  educational facilities,  hospitals  and adminis-
trative  buildings  make  the  town  the  regional  focus  for 
the  whole  polder.  Not all  the housing  at Emmeloord has 
been provided by the government appointed Board respon-
sible for the  planning and development of the polders.  An 
allocation  of sites  for private  development  has been made 
within the town. 
In marked contrast to  the settlement of the polders, the 
intensively  settled  regions  of  the  south  and  west  of  the 
Netherlands  require  different  planning  solutions.  Here  it 
is  envisaged  that  the  future  population  growth  will.  be 
housed  in  extensions  to  existing  urban  centres.  Descnbed 
in a  government report as  "concentrated deconcentration" 
this policy is one which permits the development of carefully 
planned new  urban units  in close proximity  to  established 
centres. The need to protect scarce, high quality agricultural 
land must be balanced by  the concern  in the  Netherlands 
to  provide  high  standard  housing  in  aest~etically  ple~si!lg 
environments without destroying the essential charactenstics 
of  Dutch  town  life.  The  Dutch  are  particularly  anxious 
to protect their older buildings and to  retain many of the 
traditional  street  patterns  in  the  old  towns.  The  careful 
planning for the future of Dutch urban centres runs parallel 
to  developments in Britain. Thus in  1~13, wheJ?  the  gar~en 
city  and garden suburb ideas  were  bemg  put mto  practice 
in  Britain,  the plan  for the  ~otterdam Garden Suburb at 
Vreewijk was  published, and m  1915  the plan for the new 
7  Planning  and  Creation  of an  Environment,  a  report  published  by 
the Netherlands Government, prepared by the Royal Institute of Nether-
lands' Architects. growth at Hilversum, near Amsterdam, was published. More 
recent developments are those at Hoogvliet and Spijkensee, 
on  the  outskirts  of  Rotterdam  and  Zooternect  near  The 
Hague. 
The extensions  to  the  Dutch  urban  concentrations  can 
be  seen  as  a  compromise  between  the  growth  of  large 
suburban  communities  grafted  on  to  existing  cities  and 
acting  as  little  more  than  dormitory  settlements  serving 
the  city  centre  and  the  outer  ring  of new  towns  charac-
teristic  of London and Paris. 
The  planning  of  new  towns  which  have  a  dormitory 
function  but appear  as  satellite  towns  has  been  achieved 
in Sweden.  Unlike France,  the planning of the new  towns 
is  not regarded  as  a  function  of the national  government. 
In  Sweden,  planning  is  a  local  and  regional  function. 
As in Britain and France, the need for planning has become 
most  urgent  at  the  capital  city.  The  solution  to  housing 
a  rapidly increasing  population was  the  designation  of six 
new  towns  situated to  the south  and west  of the  city and 
linked to the centre by a  fast,  efficient electric rail  system. 
The towns, although having a  dormitory function, also  con-
tain  certain  commercial,  administrative  and  social  facili-
ties. The five  new towns, namely Vallingby, Hasselbystrand, 
Farsta,  Skarholmen  and  Taby,  are  located  within  thirty 
miles  of the centre of Stockholm and are characterised by 
the skill  the architects  and planners  have shown in blend-
ing modem buildings with a  landscape of trees,  bare rocks 
and  water.  Like  the  British  new  towns,  the  population 
of the  Swedish  towns  is  planned  to  reach  30,000  in  each 
case. Surrounding the satellite new  towns are smaller settle-
ments  which  it is  assumed  will  look  to  the  new  towns  as 
their local  centres. 
A  different  type  of new  town  development can  be  seen 
in parts of Norway,  Denmark,  Germany  and Italy.  These 
are the industrially based new towns. The location of a new 
large  industrial  concern  in  a  relatively  sparsely  populated 
area  is  generally  followed  by  the  growth  of  a  town  to 
house the new  employees and their families.  The provision 
of  cultural  and  social  facilities,  and  sometimes  medical 
and educational facilities  is  sometimes  made by the indus-
trial firm.  Typical of the industrially based new  towns are 
Mo-i-Rana  and  Ryukan.  Mo-i-Rana  is  situated  just  south 
of  the  Arctic  Circle  and  owes  its  growth  to  the  location 
of  Norway's  largest  integrated  steel  mill.  The  mill  was 
opened  in  1955  and  now  the  town  has  a  population  of 
14,000.  This figure  is  small  by  British or French standards 
but  in  Norway  where  many  small  rural  settlements  are 
experiencing  declining  populations  this  is  relatively  large. 
Other Norwegian towns have grown  up in  the 1960's  close 
to  smelters  or chemical  factories  located  near  to  hydro-
electric  power stations. Examples  are Ardal and Hoyanger 
on the  Sognefjord. 
The  small  Norwegian  industrial  new  towns  have  their 
counterparts  in  Denmark.  In  the  1960's  such  towns  as 
Hirtshals,  a  new  fishing  community,  and  Munkebo,  a 
shipbuilding  town  near  Odense,  have  been  planned.  The 
most notable  German industrial  new  towns  were  founded 
in the years immediately preceding  the second World War. 
Wolfsburg  was  designed  to  accommodate  the  workers  at 
the  Volkswagen  car  plant  which  dominated  the  town. 
Similarly  the  town  of Saltzgitter,  dating  from  1938,  was 
designed  for  steel  workers.  In the  post-war  period,  towns 
designed  along  new  town  lines  have  been  planned  at 
Sennestadt, near Bielefeld, and at Neugablonz, an industrial 
town  designed to  cater for some of the numerous refugees 
who  poured into  Germany  after  the  war.  In  the  northern 
Ruhr,  two  industrial  new  towns  were  developed  for 
employees  from  particular  types  of industry  :  at Wulfen 
the  town is  associated  with  the  coal mining  industry  and, 
like  Glenrothes  in  Scotland,  the  fortune  of the  town  has 
ebbed with the decline  of the coal mining  industry.  While 
Glenrothes  recovered  and  grew  with  the  advent  of  the 
electronics  industry,  Wulfen  has  adjusted  its  plan  to  a 
reduced population growth and its present population does 
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not exceed  10,000.  In the same region is  the new  town  of 
Marl, which is linked to the chemical industry. 
In  Italy,  the  most  rapid  industrial  urban  growth  is 
being  experienced  in  the  Mezzogiorno.  Here  the  location 
of  petro-chemical  installations,  metallurgical  and  other 
manufacturing  industries  has  seen  a  rapid  growth  in 
population  in  such  towns  as  Taranto,  Brindisi  and  Bari. 
When considering these  growing towns,  one encounters the 
difficulty  of distinguishing  between  new  towns,  defined  in 
a precise, special way,  and those towns which exhibit many 
of the characteristics associated with  new  towns  but which 
are  generally  considered  as  expanding  towns. 
Rapid  population  growth  is  a  characteristic  of  all  the 
nations  in  western  Europe  as  it  is  the  trend  towards 
increasing urbanisation. These pressures are most noticeable 
in  the older large cities.  Replacing out-dated buildings  and 
providing  accommodation  for  newcomers  to  the cities  has 
forced  local  and  national  authorities  to  seek  adequate 
solutions  to  the ensuing  housing  problems.  Intensive  high 
rise  building  in  the  inner cities,  suburban  growth  and  the 
construction  of  complete  new  towns  have  been  the  most 
frequently  adopted  solutions.  Providing  housing  is  only 
a  part  of the  solution.  Access  to  fast  forms  of transport, 
provision  of industrial  and  commercial  employment  faci-
lities,  the  allocation  of  space  for  recreation  and  social 
activities,  the  segregation  of  vehicular  and  pedestrian 
movements:  these  are  some  of the features  required if the 
new  environments  are  to  be  worth  living  in.  It is  an easy 
exercise  to contrast the worst features of older urban areas 
with the best features of the new towns, but the deficiencies 
of  the  new  towns  should  not  be  overlooked.  In  Britain, 
there has been a concern over the social composition of the 
new  town  populations, there is  the emergence of the "new 
town  blues"  phenomenon  associated  with  boredom  and 
lonliness  for  housewives  who  spend  their  lives  in  what 
have  sometimes  been  described  as  concrete  deserts;  for 
teenagers  there  are  different  pressures  which  result  in 
vandalism  and  anti-social  behaviour.  To  plan  a  complete 
new  town  is  clearly  a  difficult  task  in  the  light  of  the 
rapid  changes  occurring  in  advanced  industrial  societies. 
Already  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  phases  of  new  town 
development  even  in  the  short  space  of  fifty  years.  The 
original British new towns were intended for populations of 
some  30,000.  These  towns  were  seen  as  "towns  in  the 
country", having the same measure of isolation from other 
population  centres  as  medieval  villages.  Increasing  popu-
lation pressure resulted in an increase in target figures  and 
to  the  provision  of  higher  density  residential  areas.  The 
arrival  of  the  motor  car  presented  new  problems  and  a 
clear  distinction  exists  between  those  plans  made  before 
the full  appreciation  of the effects  of  the  motor  car had 
been considered and those prepared since. The most recent 
trend is  clearly  seen  in  France where  the  new  towns  are 
conceived  as  major  urban  centres  with  population  targets 
in  excess  of  300,000  and  where  these  towns  are  seen  in 
regional  contexts.  The  modem  new  town  is  an  integral 
part of a  regional urban network,  providing social,  recrea-
tional,  educational  and  commercial  facilities  for  large 
areas.  This  concept  is  distant  from  the  original  idea 
framed  by  Ebenezer  Howard. 
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Multinational  Corporations: 
confronting  Europe  Problems 
"The experience of General Motors in  the overseas business has,  with appropriate 
variations,  been duplicated many times by business corporations of many nations.  The 
resulting global pattern of mutual interests and associations cuts across national bound-
aries  and constitutes an  interwoven  network  for  the  transfer  of knowledge,  adminis-
trative skill and technical competence that cannot fail to be progressively more meaning-
ful in man's search for a better way of life." 
Dean of the Graduate Business School, 
Columbia University. 1 
"What's good  for  General  Motors  is  not necessarily  good  for  the  USA.  What's 
good for  Mitsubishi  or  Toshiba  is  not necessarily  good  for  Japan.  What's  good  for 
Level Bros. is not necessarily  good for  the  United Kingdom.  What's good for SKF is 
nm necessarily good for  Sweden.  What's good for  Massey-Ferguson  is  not necessarily 
good for Canada. In fact,  it may well be that General Motors doesn't know what's good 
for General Motors much less for the USA." 
Paul Jennings A.F. of L-C./.0. (a leading trade union leader) 
to US Congressional committee. 
The  term  "Multinational"  is  commonly  applied  to 
the  large  international  companies  whose  names  are 
instantly  recognised  in  most  countries:  Ford,  Boeing, 
Mars, IBM, Nestles and Coca Cola being among them. 
Being  in  such  common  usage  the  term  has  become 
rather  imprecise  and  often  interpreted xenophobically 
to indicate US direct investment in other countries. This 
does  represent an important feature  of these  corpora-
tions but for a  more meaningful understanding of the 
operations undertaken by "Multinational" corporations 
a  definition  is  required, which  is  more  clear  and  less 
confusing. 
Size as such is  not necessarily a good indicator of a 
company being "multinational";  for example  the  state 
owned British Steel Corporation has all its productions' 
facilities  located  within  the  United  Kingdom  and  yet 
although one of the largest industrial  organisations in 
the world is not a multinational company. The essential 
criteria are that the firm  should have production facil-
ities in a number of countries outside its national base, 
and that the international operations of the firm  satisfy 
a  coherent  strategy  which  is  established  by  the  head 
office  of the  parent company.  Each  individual  multi-
national  corporation  has  its  own  particular  global 
strategy; some are highly centralised while in some cases 
local  management  is  relatively  free  of  detailed  head 
office control. These strategies are related to the mana-
gerial  policies  of  the  parent  company;  the  problems 
1  See  introduction  to  Frederic  Donner's,  The  World  Wide  Industrial 
Enterprise: Its challenge and promise, p. ix. 
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encountered in  various host countries such as different 
languages,  legal  systems,  and  governmental  pressures; 
and the type of product(s) being produced. For example, 
a firm making (say)  furniture, is  likely to rely on local 
knowledge  of  taste  and  operate  in  a  less  centralised 
manner than would one making (say) computers where 
the  technical  skills  of  the  parent  company  are  so 
important. 
Trading  organisations  with  considerable  overseas 
activities are not a recent development and the location 
of production centres  in  other countries  goes  back at 
least  one  hundred  years.  However,  the  post-1945 
changes  in technology  and  marketing  have  made  sig-
nificant increases in the international operations of large 
corporations possible and it is  this development which 
gives  rise  to  so  much  interest  and  concern.  Singer 
sewing  machines,  National  Cash  Register,  and  East-
man-Kodak  were  manufacturing  in  Europe  before 
1914;  between 1918 and 1939 General Motors and Ford 
were  assembling  and producing cars and trucks in the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Poland; but it 
was between 1954 and 1968 that US direct investment in 
Europe grew seven and a half times to a  book value of 
twenty billion dollars and European direct investment in 
the US grew at nearly as fast a rate. In the period 1945-
1970,  US  based companies had established  more than 
eight thousand subsidiaries in Europe, most of these in 
manufacturing and most in the countries of the  EEC. 
US and European direct foreign investment is mainly in high  technology  industries  in  concentrated  sectors 2 
where large outlays on capital equipment are necessary 
to maintain market shares and exploit new techniques; 
or sophisticated marketing is a necessary adjunct to the 
production process.  Among  the  sectors  in  which  they 
operate are petroleum, chemical, automobiles, soap and 
detergents,  telecommunication  equipment,  electronics, 
farm and construction machinery and pharmaceuticals. 
In each of these  sectors a  few  large firms  account for 
the  bulk  of  each  western  European  countries'  total 
market  and  of  these  the  major  firms  are  US  based 
multinationals, e.g. Esso, Dupont, Union Carbide, Ford, 
General  Motors,  Proctor  and  Gamble,  International 
Business  Machines,  Caterpillar  Tractors,  International 
Harvester  and  Parke-Davis;  it  is  only  Royal  Dutch 
Shell in petroleum which is really comparable in size to 
the US giants. That is  not to say that in these  sectors 
European  firms  are  insignificant;  in  chemicals  ICI, 
Rhone-Poulenc,  Hoechst,  Bayer and BASF  more than 
hold  their  own  as  do Ciba-Geigy  in  pharmaceuticals, 
Phillips, Siemens and GEC in electrics,  Dunlop-Pirelli 
in tyres and Volkswagen in automobiles; but the pace-
setters are in the main the US giants. 
Irrespective of the absolute scale of their operations 
within the European national economies, their location 
in  the  main  growth  sectors  is  most  significant.  That 
these  main  growth  sectors  are  also  those  where  the 
multinational firms  are most active leads to a  situation 
where  national governments wishing  to  stimulate  eco-
nomic  growth  are  dependent  upon  the  investment 
decisions  of firms  who  pursue a  global  rather than a 
national investment strategy. There is no obvious reason 
why their objectives should consistently coincide. 
Of  the  advanced  industrial  economies,  national  in-
come grew most rapidly in the countries of the EEC; in 
these countries, US firms  have been increasingly direct-
ing their investment. Japan, whose economy grew fastest 
of all, is a  special case, for there are legal obstacles to 
foreign firms  owning a  controlling interest in Japanese 
firms;  although  there  is  one  notable  exception,  Inter-
national Business Machines, which has been allowed to 
produce computers in Japan. 
Fast  economic  growth  has  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative effects upon the demand for consumer and 
capital goods;  rising real incomes enable more of each 
type  of  good  to  be  purchased,  but  growth  instills  a 
The largest US and European firms in selected sectors (1970) 
USA 
Petroleum and oil products: 
Standard Oil: 
Mobil Oil: 
Gulf Oil: 
Texaco: 
Cars: 
General Motors: 
Ford: 
Chrysler: 
Electrical: 
General  Electric: 
IBM: 
IT &  T: 
Western Electric: 
Westinghouse Electric: 
Chemicals: 
Dupont: 
Union Carbide: 
Monsanto: 
Dow Chemical: 
Source:  The  Times  1000  (1970-1971)  . 
Sales  (£millions) 
6,847 
3,077 
2,546 
2,445 
10,123 
6,148 
2,938 
3,520 
2,999 
2,281 
2,035 
1,462 
1,513 
1,222 
808 
749 
.2  A  concentrated  sector is  an industry  where  a  few  firms  produce  a 
high  proportion  of  total  output,  this  usually  results  in  considerable 
reduction  in  competition  the  largest  firms  using  advertising  and  tech-
nology  as  their  main  competitive  weapons  rather  than  price.  Markets 
of  this  type  are  most  prevalent  in  advanced  industrial  economies  and 
are termed by economists as oligopolistic. 
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European 
Sales  (£millions) 
Royal Dutch Shell  (N/UK): 
British Petroleum (UK): 
EHI (1): 
Compagnie Fran9aise des  Petroles (F): 
3,950 
2,243 
936 
631 
Volkswagen (G): 
Daimler-Benz (G): 
British-Leyland (UK): 
Fiat: 
Philips Electrical (N): 
Siemens  (G): 
GEC-AEI (UK): 
AEG-Telefunken (G): 
ICI (UK): 
Bayer (G): 
Montedison  (1): 
Hoechst (G): 
1,611 
1,092 
970 
951 
1,518 
1,120 
970 
814 
1,355 
1,221 
1,109 
1,064 
psychology which increases the level of investment and 
hastens the introduction of new technology. Equally as 
incomes  increase  the  range  of goods  which  the  indi-
vidual  is  able to  purchase expands and firms  innovate to  satisfy  and  through  marketing  create  new  and 
increasing demand. 
National governments are confronted with a dilemma. 
On the  one  hand  the international corporation  brings 
growth inducing investment, new technologies and work, 
while on the other important areas of economic activity 
become foreign  owned. The problem is  exacerbated by 
transfer  pricing  and  the  use  of  multiple  foreign  cur-
rency  holdings.  Transfer  pricing  is  where  goods  are 
traded between sections of the firm  located in differing 
countries at prices which do not relate to the true cost 
of  inputs;  this  effectively  means  that  profits  can  be 
declared in the country which  offers  the  best  taxation 
concessions. Multiple foreign currency funds enable the 
international  corporation  to  move  their  holdings  of 
currency from one country to another in order to avoid 
the losses entailed when a currency is  devalued or gains 
when a currency is revalued, at times of monetary crisis 
this  action  may  well  be  critical  for  national  govern-
ments. 
Economic  policies  are  usually  intended  to  attain, 
among other things, full employment and a satisfactory 
external payments position. The multinational firm  can 
cause problems in both these areas. A good example of 
the former was when in August  1962  General Motors 
sacked some 685 out of 3,100 workers at their refrigera-
tion works in Genvilliers near Paris claiming that Italian 
refrigerators were undercutting them and forcing  them 
out of the market; another was  when  two weeks  later 
Remington-Rand transferred the production of portable 
typewriters  to  a  new  plant  in  the  Netherlands,  this 
resulted in 800 of 1,200 workers at their Caluire et Cuire 
Plant  being  dismissed.  By  rationalising  production 
globally,  the  MNC  does  not  trade  finished  products 
from all plants, but to a large extent trades components 
of the finished  product between plants.  Ford, Chrysler, 
and General Motors are all in the process of rationalis-
ing car production  at the European level;  engines pro-
duced at one plant, motor bodies in another, gear and 
axle assemblies in yet another, these finally  being sent 
to  an  assembly  plant for  producing  the  finished  car. 
Firms  who  find  this  type  of  production  to  be  most 
efficient are not always going to satisfy a government's 
desire  for  a  satisfactory balance  between  imports  and 
exports. 
Without  a  comprehensive  industrial  policy  govern-
ments may well be instrumental in aggravating the long 
term  bad  effects  of  the  multinational  corporation. 
Among the countries of the EEC, an industrial policy 
needs  to  be  framed  at  the  Community  level;  for 
example,  if  the  Netherlands  offers  inducements  to  a 
multinational firm,  such as  generous investment grants, 
the  firm  may locate  in  this  country  while  still  having 
tariff-free access to (say) the French market where such 
generous  investment  grants  may  not  exist.  The Com-
mission  of  the  EEC  has  made  proposals  which  are 
intended to deal with these problems; they include: 
(1)  Harmonisation of fiscal policies such as corporate 
taxation, investment grants, etc. 
(2)  Enlargement of the European capital  market so 
that European firms  have better access  to  invest-
ment funds. 
(3)  Harmonisation  of standards  of products,  labour 
legislation, etc. 
It is hoped that such  a  law  would  encourage  more 
mergers between European firms to enable them to com-
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pete with US multinationals and that all  multinationals 
would  be subject to  the  control  of a  coherent  Com-
munity industrial policy. This has not yet however been 
accepted by the Council of Ministers and certain prob-
lems such as the need for restructuring parts of Euro-
pean industry  and the  relative  weakness  of European 
firms in advanced technology industries are still in need 
of urgent attention. 
At the level  of an industrial policy a great deal still 
remains  to  be done  but in certain cases  by  using  the 
competition  clauses  of the  Rome Treaty  the  activities 
of certain multinationals have been curbed.  The West-
inghouse Corporation's attempt to take over Jeumont-
Schneider,  the  Franco-Belgian  electrical  firm  was 
delayed and Continental Can are at present having their 
market  power scrutinised  by  the  Commission;  several 
large chemical firms  have been fined  by  the European 
Court for  breaches  of  the  competitive  clauses  of the 
Rome Treaty. A better framework of law is needed for 
supervising the activities  of multinational corporations 
and the Commission's proposals do cover much of the 
relevant ground. 
International  corporations  locate  production  to 
exploit any one of a number of advantages which could 
be  cheaper  labour,  fewer  legal  restrictions  and  an 
expanding market. For example, in the summer of 1970 
the price of semi-conductors in Europe and the US fell 
dramatically because they were being imported in large 
quantities from Singapore,  Formosa, South Korea and 
the Phillipines at around a fifth of the price when pro-
duced in Europe or the USA. These plants were owned 
by  large US based  international corporations who,  by 
rationalising production on a global scale and investing 
in areas of low labour costs,  were  able to switch  pro-
duction and reduce costs. 
Trades unions find  the international firm  difficult  to 
deal  with.  An  employer  who  can  switch  production 
between  countries  is  not an  easy  person  to  negotiate 
with.  Unions  when  operating  with  the  traditional 
national  firm,  have  a  fair  measure  of the  employer's 
strength and his  bargaining position but the impact of 
multinational corporations has forced unions to rethink 
their strategies. 
In a report on their attitude to multinational corpora-
tions,  the TUC gave  examples  of the  actions  of some 
international corporations when confronted with indus-
trial  unrest.  Pirelli  attempted  to  circumvent  strikes  in 
Italy by importing non-union labour frome Greece and 
Spain;  after an industrial  dispute,  Raytheon's  factory 
in Sicily  was  closed  down;  Henry Ford threatened  to 
reduce investment in the UK because of labour disputes. 
The International Confederation of Free Trades Unions 
in a  submission  to  a  US  Congress  Committee  named 
IBM,  Kodak,  United  Fruit  Company  and  Firestone 
Tyre as being particularly bad in their refusal to recog-
nise unions. 
While  governments  are  considering  action  at  the 
Community level  leaders of unions are convinced that 
to  be  effective  action  at  the  international  level  is 
essential. They are now operating in some sectors at an 
international level to counteract the power of the multi-
national  corporation,  in  particular  in  chemicals  and 
automobiles.  The  International  Chemical  Workers' 
Federation arranged a co-ordinated bargaining strategy 
between their French, US, German and Italian affiliates 
towards  St.-Gobain  the  French  chemical  and  glass 
corporation;  after  a  long  period  of  co-ordinated bargaining and a  nine  week  strike in the  US  the  out-
come  was  successful  from  the  unions  point  of  view. 
International  committees  have  been  set  up  to  cover 
specific  firms  such  as  Ford,  General  Motors,  General 
Electric  and Westinghouse  and moves  to  international 
bargaining  have  been  agreed  with  the  Dutch  firm 
Philips  Electrical  and Swiss  owned  Brown-Boverie.  In 
some cases help has been given by strong unions in the 
parent country to workers in subsidiaries located in less 
developed  countries;  for  example  help  given  by  the 
German Chemical Workers Union (IG Chemie-Papier-
Kerawik)  to  the  Turkish  workers  fighting  for  union 
recognition at the Hoechst subsidiary in Turkey. How-
ever, trade union leaders will  be the first  to admit that 
much more needs to be done. 
On the assumption that present trends continue, over 
the  next  ten years  an even  larger  proportion  of total 
output  in  western  Europe  will  be  provided  by  inter-
national  corporations  and  of  these  an  even  larger 
number  will  be  rationalising  their  activities  to  satisfy 
clearly defined global objectives. 
Products  having  a  stable  technology  and  requiring 
relatively  simple labour skills  will  increasingly  be pro-
duced in the developing countries in order to exploit the 
available  supply  of cheap  labour.  Japanese  firms  are 
already  building  ships  in  Formosa and  Malaysia  and 
US firms  are producing semi-conductors and electronic 
components in Singapore and the Phillipines. A leading 
member of the International Autoworkers Council has 
predicted  that in  the  not too  distant  future  cars  will 
be  produced  for  the  European  market  from  plants 
located in North Africa. 
The multinational  corporation  has  developed  ahead 
of changes in the institutional structure of international 
trade; for example, the formation of the EEC. In view 
of this  they  have  been  able  to  exploit  the  advantages 
arising  from  these  changes  more  effectively  than  the 
traditional  national firms  of the  countries  involved  in 
the new groupings. Economically they have transferred 
capital and skills between countries (Mainly developed 
economies)  but in  the process  they  have  procured  for 
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themselves certain of the prerogatives which are tradi-
tionally  those  of the  nation  state.  For  example  they 
decide in which country they will pay tax, invest or raise 
capital. 
Neither the histrionic approach which exaggerates the 
immediate problems nor the complacent approach which 
refuses  to  recognise  the  existence  of  problems  is  of 
much use  to the countries of western Europe.  Policies 
must  effectively  counter  the  excesses  of  international 
corporations and yet encourage the beneficial effects of 
the transfer of capital and technology between countries. 
An  understanding  of  the  development  of  industrial 
organisations is  critical to the quality of life in Europe 
over the next fifty years. 
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